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NOTE
PROSECUTOR'S DISCRETION *
The discretionary power exercised by the prosecuting attorney in
initiation, accusation, and discontinuance of prosecution gives him more
control over an individual's liberty and reputation than any other public
official.' A proper exercise of this power expedites the speedy and efficient
administration of criminal justice by eliminating cases in which there is
little likelihood of conviction in the early stages of prosecution. It also
enables the prosecutor to eliminate or defer a criminal prosecution as part
of a tactical move. However, the future of many individuals and the
protection of the community may hinge on the judgments of a prosecuting
attorney who, through inertia, bias,2 inability or inexperience,8 unwisely
exercises the responsibilities of his office. Since he is usually an elected
official,4 questions of political expediency may affect both the diligence with
which he carries out his functions and his choice of assistants. Personal
enmities or friendships may have a similar effect. On the other hand,
these dangers can be reduced substantially by controls which mitigate
against the abuse of discretion. The purpose of this Note is to examine
the more significant areas in which the prosecutor's discretion operates.
* The research for this Note was financed by funds granted to the University
of Pennsylvania Law School for studies on Law Enforcement and Individual Liberty.
Jacob Kossman, Esq., of the Philadelphia Bar, has established a fund for this purpose
in memory of the late Justice Wiley Rutledge.
The Law Review wishes to express its appreciation for the generous cooperation
of the personnel of the Philadelphia District Attorney's Office whose assistance was
of great value.
1. Hobbs, Prosecutor's Bias, An Occupational Disease, 2 ALA. L. REv. 40, 41
(1949) ; Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 3 (1940);
see Baker & DeLong, The Prosecuting Attorney and His Office, 25 J. CRm!. L. &
CRImINOLOY 695, 719 (1935).
2. See Hobbs, supra note 1, discussing the effect of the prosecuting attorney's
bias on investigation and courtroom action.
3. Baker & DeLong, supra note 1, at 698-702, indicate that the lack of qualifica-
tions and inexperience found in the small town's prosecuting attorney's office are not
as prevalent in the larger communities where better salary and office provisions are
offered.
4. Cf. California, where the local prosecuting attorney either may be elected or
appointed according to the local county charter. CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 5; CAL. POL.
CODE §§ 4013, 4021 (1944). In many of the counties of Connecticut, the judges of
the criminal court appoint the prosecuting attorney. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7664 (1949).
The governor of New Jersey, with the advice and consent of the senate, appoints the
local prosecutor. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:158-1 (1939). In North Carolina some
local prosecutors are appointed. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7-203, 7-235, 7-408 (1953). In
two states, the prosecution function is carried on by the attorney general. DEL.
CoNsT. art. III, § 21; R.I. CoN5sT. art. VII, § 12; R.I. GEN. LAWS c. 10, § 5 (1938).
5. See MOLEY, POLITICS AND CRIMINAL PROSECUTION 74-94 (1929).
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INVESTIGATION OF CRIME AND INITIATION OF PROSECUTION
One of the varied responsibilities of the prosecutor is his duty to in-
vestigate crime and to initiate prosecution against suspected individuals.
For the most part the nature and extent of this function is not set forth by
statute,6 although there are exceptions. 7 Some statutes provide that the
prosecuting attorney must institute criminal or civil proceedings for cer-
tain specified violations.8 Case law indicates that the prosecutor has a duty
to cause the investigation, arrest, and prosecution of violations of the law
that come to his knowledge and for which the police or private complain-
ants have taken no action 9 unless he has a good faith reason for his
inaction.' The effect of this power in the prosecutor has been to create
an area of discretionary action. Courts generally refuse to order the
prosecutor to initiate a prosecution on the ground that it is a discretionary
act which may not be compelled by mandamus.-" However, the failure of
the prosecutor to enforce the law is generally held to be ground for
removal.' 2
To aid the prosecutor in the initiation of prosecution a few states
have given him the power to subpoena any person deemed to have relevant
6. See Baker & DeLong, The Prosecuting Attorney-Powers and Duties it
Criminal Prosecution, 24 J. Cran. L. & CmRmINoLoavy 1025, 1064 (1934). The
prosecutor is commonly provided with investigators. See, e.g., CoLO. STAT. ANN.
c. 55, § 15(1) (Supp. 1953); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 5.791 (1936); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 16, §§ 276-81 (Purdon 1930) ; Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 324(2) (1952).
7. Idaho and Iowa make it the duty of the prosecutor to enforce the laws of
the state. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 31-2227 (Supp. 1953); IowA CODE c. 336, § 336.2(1)
(1950). New Jersey requires that the prosecutor exercise reasonable diligence in
the detection, arrest, indictment and conviction of offenders. N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A :158-5 (1953). South Carolina provides that the prosecutor shall aid in the pro-
curement of evidence. S.C. CODE § 15-622 (1952). Several states provide that when
the prosecutor has reasonable grounds to believe that a person has committed a
crime, he shall cause the arrest and prosecution of that person. UTAHI CODE ANN.
§ 17-18-1(2) (1953); WASHE. REv. CODE §3627.020(6) (1951); W. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 371(1) (1949).
8. E.g., IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 123.60, 123.62 (1949) (enjoin violations of liquor
laws) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 23, § 4392 (Supp. 1954) (initiate suits for support against
relatives of needy people). See DeLong & Baker, Powers and Duties of the Prosecut-
ing Attorney: Quasi-Criminal and Civil, 25 J. CRim. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 21 (1934).
The result of the prosecutor's inaction is usually not explicitly prescribed. But see
Nay. Comp. LAws § 2043 (1929) (prosecutor will forfeit his office on failure to abate
nuisances when directed by the Board of County Commissioners); ORE. REv. STAT.
§ 167.515 (1953) (prosecutor shall be removed from office and fined on refusal or
neglect to prosecute violations of anti-gambling laws diligently).
9. Wilbur v. Howard, 70 F. Supp. 930 (E.D. Ky. 1947); Speer v. State, 130
Ark. 457, 198 S.W. 113 (1917); State ex inf. McKittrick v. Graves, 346 Mo. 990,
144 S.W.2d 91 (1940); State ex inf. McKittrick v. Wymore, 345 Mo. 169, 132
S.W.2d 979 (1939).
10. State ex rel. Gebrink v. Hospers, 147 Iowa 712, 126 N.W. 818 (1910);
State ex rel. Coleman v. Trinkle, 70 Kan. 396, 78 Pac. 854 (1904); State ex rel.
Bourg v. Marrero, 132 La. 109, 61 So. 136 (1913); Attorney Gen. v. Tufts, 239
Mass. 458, 132 N.E. 322 (1921).
11. Leone v. Fanelli, 194 Misc. 826, 87 N.Y.S.2d 850 (Sup. Ct. 1949); Murphy
v. Sumners, 54 Tex. Crim. 369, 112 S.W. 1070 (1908).
12. See text at pp. 1083-86.
PROSECUTOR'S DISCRETION
information and to compel his testimony under oath.'3 Proponents of
such measures claim that the grand jury is inefficient in conducting secret
investigations. 4 While such authority would undoubtedly aid the prose-
cuting attorney in uncovering criminal activity, there is a possibility of
serious and permanent harm to an individual's reputation if the prosecutor
should use his authority for personal or political advantage ' 5 by conduct-
ing investigations of political opponents without proper cause. A recent
bill proposed by the Philadelphia District Attorney might obviate this
difficulty. It would give the prosecutor inquisitorial power in cases of
conspiracy, bribery, corruption of public officials, election violation or
systematic violations of the law, but would require court authority before
it could be used.'"
FORMAL AccusATIoN
By Indictment
Once there has been an initial determination to prosecute an indi-
vidual, a formal accusation is necessary before he can be subjected to a
criminal trial.' 7 Indictment by a grand jury is the traditional, and still
widely employed, method of accusation.' 8 It is the prerogative of the
prosecuting attorney to appear before and advise the grand jury.19 The
accused and other parties cannot appear as a matter of right.2° Many
statutes provide that the prosecutor must appear before the grand jury
at its request.21 While most cases presented to the grand jury have been
13. DEL. CODE ANN. tit 29, §2505 (1953); FLA. STAT. ANN. §34.14 (1943).
Some states limit the prosecutor's inquisitorial authority to investigations of felonies
and provide it can be exercised only with court approval. N.M. STAT. ANN.
§41-3-8 (1954) (additional provision that the power may not be exercised while
the grand jury is in session); OrLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §258 (1937). In New
Jersey, investigators attached to the prosecutor's office are enabled to administer
oaths, N.J. STAT. ANN. §41:2-3.1 (Supp. 1954), but have no power to subpoena
witnesses or compel testimony. See State v. Eisenstein, 16 N.J. Super. 8, 13, 83
A.2d 777, 779 (1951), affd, 9 N.J. 347, 88 A.2d 366 (1952).
14. Philadelphia Bulletin, May 10, 1955, p. 14, col. 1.
15. Gallagher, The One-Man Grand Jury-A Reply, 29 J. AM. Jun. Soc. 20,
24 (1945).
16. See note 14 supra.
17. CLARK, CRIMINAL PRoCEnuIRE 122 (2d ed., Mikell 1918).
18. Felonies must be prosecuted after grand jury accusation in 22 states as
well as the federal courts. These states are: Ala., Del., Ga. (there being no pro-
vision in the constitution or statute, it is presumed that common law prevails), Ill.,
Ky., Me., Md., Mass., Miss., N.H., NJ., N.Y., N.C., Ohio, Ore., Pa. (the prose-
cuting attorney can present an indictment if the accused waives the grand jury
requirement), RI. (the accused can waive the grand jury indictment with leave of
court except in cases of murder), S.C., Tenn., Tex., Va., and W. Va.
19. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 30, § 94 (1940) ; COLO. STAT. ANN. c. 55, § 6 (1935);
ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 132.090, 132.330(1) (1953) ; VA. CODE § 19-131 (1950).
20. United States ex rel McCann v. Thompson, 144 F.2d 604 (2d Cir. 1940);
Duke v. United States, 90 F.2d 840 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 685 (1937).
21. See, e.g., ME. Rav. STAT. c. 148, § 6 (1954); Miss. CODE ANN. § 3921 (1942);
N.Y. CODE CRam. PRoc. § 263; ORE. Rv. STAT. §8.670 (1953).
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heard preliminarily by a magistrate, 22 there is usually no requirement that
the accused shall have had such a hearing,2 and the prosecutor can submit
charges to the grand jury against individuals who have never had a pre-
liminary examination. It would appear, therefore, that a previous dis-
missal of a charge by a magistrate would not prevent the prosecutor from
submitting the case to the grand jury.2 4  Since a grand jury cannot indict
unless the evidence before it shows that the accused is prima facie
guilty,2 5 there is a theoretical check on unjustified prosecutions. In many
instances, however, it appears that the grand jury merely "rubber stamps"
the suggestions of the prosecutor and thereby permits him to make the
real determination of who will be formally accused2 6
In the event that a grand jury refuses to indict, there is divergence
of opinion on whether the same charge can be submitted to a subsequent
grand jury.27  Many jurisdictions permit resubmission of an ignored
charge, but only upon order of the criminal court.2 8 This prevents con-
tinuing harassment of an individual through repetitive presentation of an
unfounded charge to a grand jury, but it does not completely foreclose
22. When a person is arrested on a criminal charge, he is brought before a
magistrate for a preliminary hearing. If the magistrate finds that the evidence
against the person establishes probable cause to believe the person is guilty of the
offense for which he was arrested, the magistrate will hold him, either in jail or on
bail, for accusation and trial. If probable cause is not established, the magistrate
will discharge the person from the arrest. CLARx, op. cit. supra note 17, at 88.
23. United States v. Fuers, 25 Fed. Cas. 1223, No. 15,174 (W.D. Pa. 1870);
State v. Werner, 128 La. 1, 54 So. 402 (1911) ; State v. Webster, 39 N.H. 96 (1859).
In Pennsylvania, the prosecuting attorney may submit a bill to the grand jury with-
out a preliminary examination when there is some pressing and adequate reason to
do so. See Commonwealth v. Green, 126 Pa. 531, 537, 539-40, 17 Atl. 878, 879-80
(1889); Rowand v. Commonwealth, 82 Pa. 405, 408-09 (1876); Commonwealth v.
Brown, 23 Pa. Super. 470, 496 (1903); Commonwealth v. Sheppard, 20 Pa. Super.
417, 419 (1902).
24. When the grand jury returns an indictment against a defendant who has not
had, or has been discharged at, a preliminary examination, he can be taken into
custody and held for trial without any further proceedings. CLARK, op. cit. supra
note 17, at 89.
25. CLARK, op. cit. mpra note 17, at 135.
26. NATIONAL ComassIoN ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, PROsEcu-
TION 124-25 (1931).
27. Resubmission of an ignored charge was permitted in United States v.
Thompson, 251 U.S. 407, 69 U. OF PA. L. REV. 80 (1920). Accord, State v. Harris,
91 N.C. 656 (1884). Contra: State v. Green, 111 Mo. 585, 20 S.W. 304 (1892);
Rowand v. Commonwealth, 82 Pa. 405 (1876). See also Comment, 31 MicH. L.
REv. 1160 (1933).
28. Amz. CODE ANN. § 44-631 (1939); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-922 (1947);
IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 19-1402, 19-1403 (1948) ; IOWA CODE c. 771, § 22 (1949) ; Ky.
CODES, Cmm. PRAc. § 116 (1948) ; MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 94-6330 (1947) ; N.M.
STAT. ANN. §41-5-27 (1953); N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. §270; N.D. REV. CODE
§29-1042 (1943); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §383 (1937); S.D. CODE §34.1234
(1939) ; WASH. REV. CODE § 10.28.180 (1951).
Georgia has no requirement of court approval, but permits only two submissions
of the same charge. A third submission is permitted upon order of the court if the
bills were ignored because of fraud, or if new evidence against the defendant is
discovered. GA. CODE ANN. § 27-702 (1953). Utah permits resubmission of an
ignored charge only at the next ensuing term of the criminal court and only upon
court order. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-20-2 (1953). West Virginia, by statute, per-
mits unlimited resubmission. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 5294 (1949).
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vindication of a public wrong because of premature submission of a
complaint.
By Information
An alternative to the grand jury indictment as the method of formal
accusation is the prosecutor's information.2 9 There is a wide disparity
among the states as to the extent to which the formal accusation may be
made by information. The range extends from federal law, where a de-
fendant has a constitutional right to a grand jury indictment for any
crime punishable by more than one year of imprisonment,30 to some
western states where there is no limit on the permissible use of the in-
formation.3 The major division among the states, however, is on the
issue of whether or not an information can be used for the more serious
crimes.3 2  Comparison among the states is complex because of distinctions
in the classification of crimes. At present there are twenty-six states
which permit accusation by information for those crimes which are classi-
fied by the respective state as felonies.33 While there are undoubtedly
differences as to the lesser crimes which would fall in this category, there
will be substantial unanimity on the major crimes. A recurrent exception
to the authority to accuse for a felony by information is a provision exclud-
ing its use where the offense is punishable by either death or life imprison-
ment.34
29. See CLARK, op. cit. supra note 17, at 144.
30. "No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising
in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war
or public danger; . . ." U.S. CoNsT. amend. V. See Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S.
417 (1885); United States v. Moreland, 258 U.S. 433 (1922). This requirement
can be waived by the accused. FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(b).
31. See note 33 infra. See also ALI CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §§ 113-17
(1930); Moley, The Initiation of Criminal Prosecutions by Indictment or Informa-
tion, 29 MICH. L. REv. 403 (1931); Dession, From Indictment to Information-
Implications of the Shift, 42 YALE L.J. 163 (1932).
32. See WAITE, THE CRIMINAL LAW AND ITs ENFORCEMENT 728 (3d ed. 1947).
33. Ariz., Ark., Cal., Colo., Conn. (applies to all felonies except those punish-
able by death or life imprisonment), Fla. (applies to all felonies except those carry-
ing capital punishment), Idaho, Kan., La. (applies to all felonies except those carry-
ing capital punishment), Mich., Minn. (applies to all felonies except those punish-
able by death or life imprisonment), Mo., Mont, Neb., Nev., N.M. (accusation by
information allowed only when the grand jury is not in session, but the grand jury
meets only when ordered by the court or the Board of County Commissioners or a
petition by 10% of the voters in the county), N.D., Okla., S.D., Utah, Vt (applies
to all felonies except those punishable by death or life imprisonment), Wash.,
Wis., Wyo.
Iowa permits accusation of felonies by information when the grand jury is not
in session in county district courts. IowA CODE ANN. § 769.2 (1950). The grand
jury, however, seems to meet periodically. See Perkins, The Trial Information in
Iowa, 13 IowA L. REv. 264, 286-89 (1928).
Indiana permits the accusation of all felonies, except treason and murder, by
the sworn affidavit of any person. IN]D. ANN. STAT. § 9-908, 9-1123 (Burns 1933).
The statute says that the affidavit shall be submitted to the prosecuting attorney and
he shall approve it. Id. § 9-909. It appears, however, that the prosecuting attorney,
despite the mandatory statutory language, has the discretion to approve or disap-
prove the affidavit. See Ops. ATr'Y GEN. OF IND. 78 (1938).
34. See note 33 supra.
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Where the prosecutor has been granted the power to accuse by in-
formation, his discretion in using that power is generally delimited by
a requirement that the defendant have been held at a preliminary examina-
tion before a magistrate.8 5 The efficacy of this procedure in controlling the
prosecutor's discretion as to when and against whom to proceed is im-
paired by the fact that frequently it appears that magistrate's hearings
may be completely dominated by the prosecuting attorney. 6 Furthermore,
in the absence of an express statutory provision to the contrary, it is
generally held that discharge by one magistrate on a finding of no probable
cause will not preclude presenting the case to another magistrate in order
to get the prerequisite magisterial action.
8 7
Of the jurisdictions requiring preliminary examinations, some allow
the prosecutor to inform only for crimes for which the defendant was
held;8 8 others permit the prosecutor to inform for any crime revealed in
the evidence before the magistrate so long as the crime embodied in the
information bears a reasonably close relation to the offense for which the
defendant was held.3 9 This prevents malicious prosecution but permits
35. Some statutes specifically require that the defendant have been held by the
magistrate before an information will lie. ARX. STAT. ANN. § 43-806 (1947); CAL.
PEN. CODE § 738 (Supp. 1953); MicH. STAT. ANN. §§28.980, 28.933 (1954); N.M.
CosT. art. II, § 14; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-6-4 (1953); UTAH CoNsT. art. I, § 13.
Other statutes say only that the accused must have had a preliminary examination
before an information will lie, but these have been interpreted to mean that the
defendant must first be held by a magistrate before an information can be filed
against him. ARiz. CODE ANN. § 44-503 (1939) ; Duke v. State, 49 Ariz. 93, 64 P.2d
1033 (1937). IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-1308 (1948); State v. McGreevey, 17 Idaho
453, 105 Pac. 1047 (1925). KAN. GEN. STAT. § 62-805 (1949); State v. Goetz,
65 Kan. 125, 69 Pac. 187 (1902). Mo. ANN. STAT. § 544.250 (Vernon 1953) ; State v.
McKinley, 341 Mo. 1186, 111 S.W.2d 115 (1937). NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-1607 (1943) ;
Richards v. State, 22 Neb. 145 (1887). OKIA. CoNsT. art. II, § 17; Fields v. State,
5 Okla. Crim. 520, 115 Pac. 608 (1911). S.D. CODE § 34.1503 (1939); State v.
Anderson, 60 S.D. 187, 244 N.W. 119 (1932). Wis. STAT. § 355.18 (1953); State v.
Whatley, 210 Wis. 157, 245 N.W. 93 (1933). Minnesota is the only state with this
type of statute in which no such interpretation was found. MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 628.31 (West 1947).
In Louisiana, a preliminary examination is not considered a prerequisite to a
prosecutor's information. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:154 (1951); State v. Smith,
130 La. 701, 58 So. 515 (1912). The accused does, however, have a right to a
preliminary examination before the information is filed if he so demands. If demand
for a preliminary examination is made after the information is filed, it is discretion-
ary with the trial court to grant or refuse the demand. Ibid. If at the preliminary
examination the magistrate finds no probable cause to believe the defendant guilty,
he is to be discharged. Id. § 15:155.
36. Baker, The Prosecutor-Inzitiation of Prosecution, 23 J. Cimr. L. &
CRIMINOLOrY 770, 792-93 (1933) ; see State v. McGreevey, 17 Idaho 453, 457-58, 105
Pac. 1047, 1048 (1909).
37. This is because jeopardy has not yet attached. Gaffney v. Aldrich, 85 Mich.
138, 48 N.W. 478 (1891); State v. Kile, 96 Okla. Crim. 148, 250 P.2d 233 (1952).
But cf. Wis. STAT. § 355.20 (1953), which provides that the accused can be rearrested
and reexamined after discharge by a magistrate only upon discovery of new evidence.
38. State v. McGreevey, 17 Idaho 453, 105 Pac. 1047 (1909); Payne v. State,
30 Okla. Crim. 218, 235 Pac. 558 (1925).
39. People v. Baird, 212 Cal. 632, 300 Pac. 23 (1931) ; State v. Miner, 120 Kan.
187, 243 Pac. 318 (1926). See Comments,'19 CAUF. L. REv. 645 (1931), 19 id. at
330, 18 id. at 324 (1930) ; ALI CODE OF CRIMINAL PROcEURE 54-55 (1930).
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the prosecutor to decide which crime the evidence fits without being bound
by the magistrate's designation.
Some jurisdictions permit the prosecutor to file an information for
a felony after preliminary procedures other than a hearing before a magis-
trate. Among the proceedings deemed satisfactory are special permission
by the court,4° or a sworn affidavit based on personal knowledge of the
affiant that a crime was committed, 41 or a combination of the two.4
Several states dispense with the requirement of a preliminary procedure
before the information for crimes committed during or near to the term
of the criminal court.43 A few states permit the prosecutor to file an in-
formation for a felony without any statutory requisite of a preliminary
procedure to limit the prosecutor's discretion.44  It seems reasonable to
infer that in those jurisdictions which do not require a magistrate's hear-
ing, the prosecutor will be permitted to inform despite a previous discharge
by a magistrate on the same charge, since jeopardy has not yet attached.
45
All states that provide for accusation by information retain the pro-
cedure of indictment by grand jury, but the latter will be seldom used
since the grand jury is generally called only infrequently." Only two
40. MONT. CoNsT. art. III, §8.
41. COLO. STAT. ANN. c. 48, §§461, 455 (1935).
42. NEv. Comr. LAws § 11328 (1929); State v. Wells, 39 Nev. 432, 159 Pae:
520 (1916).
43. N.D. Ray. CODE § 29-0902 (1943) (No preliminary procedure is required
to the filing of an information against crimes committed during the term of the
court). Wyo. Comn'. STAT. ANN. § 10-607 (1945) (No preliminary procedure
is required where the information is filed within 30 days before or after the first
day of the criminal court's term; if this method is utilized, and the defendant is
not tried at that term of court because of a motion to continue by the prosecution,
the accused is entitled to an immediate preliminary examination).
44. In Connecticut, a preliminary examination is not a prerequisite to a prose-
cutor's information, State v. Hayes, 127 Conn. 543, 580-81, 18 A.2d 895, 914 (1941),
but a statute provides that the trial court has control over informations and may
at any time, upon motion of the defendant, dismiss an information because there was
insufficient cause to justify bringing the information. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8769
(1949). Florida merely provides that the information is to be filed under oath.
FLA. STAT. ANN. §904.01 (1944). In Iowa, where the prosecutor's information
will lie only when the grand jury is not in session (see note 33 supra), the only
prerequisite provided is that the information be verified. IoWA CODE ANN. § 769.6
(1949). In Indiana where accusation is made by affidavit with approval of the
prosecuting attorney (see note 33 supra), no preliminary procedure seems to be re-
quired. No provision was found in Vermont.
45. But cf. N.D. Rxv. CODE §29-0905 (1943) (No information may be filed
after such dismissal without leave of court).
46. The grand jury meets periodically in only two such states. Airu. STAT.
ANN. §22-318 (1947); LA. Ray. STAT. ANN. §15:189 (1951). See also Pierro
v. Turner, 95 Okla. Crim. 425, 427, 247 P2d 292-93 (1952), noting the infrequent
use of the indictment.
Some of the remaining jurisdictions provide that the grand jury meets only
when summoned by order of the court. ARiz. CONsT. art. vi, § 6; COLO. STAT. ANN.
c. 95, § 58 (1935); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8747 (1949); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 905.01
(1944); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 2-501 (1948); MicH. STAT. ANN. § 28.947 (1954);
MINN. STAT. ANN. §628.42 (West 1947); Mo. ANN. STAT. §540.020 (Vernon
1953); MONT. CONsT. art. III, § 8; S.D. CODE § 32.1009 (1939); UTAH CODE ANN.
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states have statutory provision for the possibility of a conflict between
these two methods of accusation. One authorizes and the other prohibits
an information after a grand jury has refused to indict on the same
chargeYt  Decisions in other states also vary.48  One court held that an
information could be filed on a charge that had been ignored by the grand
jury, even though a court order would have been necessary in that state
to resubmit the bill to the grand jury.49
The prosecutor who has unrestricted power to accuse could, if he is so
inclined, harass individuals for any of a number of reasons, including the
desire to enhance his reputation by means of the publicity and possible
conviction, or the honest but mistaken belief of the guilt of the accused.
The requirement of a preliminary hearing before a magistrate affords some
protection, but, since the prosecutor is generally immune from civil suit
for malicious prosecution,5 the only other significant checks are extrinsic
measures designed to penalize official misconduct.5 1
Discretion Not to Accuse
In those states where indictment by grand jury is the exclusive method
of accusation for serious crimes,52 there is the possibility that the prosecutor
might interfere with the movement of the charge from the magistrate to
the grand jury. This problem apparently has seldom been considered,53
§77-18-1 (1953); VT. REv. STAT. § 1584 (1947); WAsH. CoNsT. art. I, §26; Wis.
STAT. §255.10 (1953); Wyo. ComP. STAT. ANN. § 12-136 (1945).
In Indiana, where accusation is permitted by any person's affidavit on approval
of the prosecuting attorney (see note 33 supra), the grand jury meets only when
the court so orders. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 9-802, 9-803 (Burns 1933).
Other states provide that the grand jury meets on petition of a specified number
of county residents. NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-1401 (1943); N.M. CONsT. art. II,
§ 18. In Kansas the grand jury can be summoned by petition of county taxpayers.
KAN. GEN. STAT. § 62-901 (1948). Two states call for convening the grand jury
on order of the board of county commissioners. NEV. CoMp. LAws §8478 (1929);
N.D. REv. CoDE §29-0909 (1943).
47. Idaho prohibits the prosecutor from filing an information accusing a person
of a charge that has been ignored by a grand jury. IDAHO CoNsT. art. I, § 8. The
same charge may, however, be resubmitted to a subsequent grand jury by order of the
court. IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 19-402, 19-403 (1948). Washington allows an ignored
charge to be resubmitted to the grand jury or to become the subject of a prosecutor's
information upon order of the court. WASH. REv. CODE § 10.28.180 (1951).
48. Ex parte Moan, 65 Cal. 216, 3 Pac. 644 (1884); State ex rel. Latour v.
Stone, 135 Fla. 816, 185 So. 729 (1939) ; and State v. Whipple, 57 Vt. 637 (1885),
permit an ignored charge to become the basis of an information. Contra: State v.
Boswell, 104 Ind. 541, 4 N.E. 675 (1885); Richards v. State, 22 Neb. 145, 34
N.W. 346 (1887).
49. Pierro v. Turner, 95 Okla. Crim. 425, 247 P.2d 291 (1952); Rea v. State,
3 Okla. Crim. 269, 105 Pac. 381 (1909).
50. Smith v. Parman, 101 Kan. 115, 165 Pac. 663 (1917) ; Anderson v. Bishop,
304 Mass. 396, 23 N.E.2d 1003 (1939); Watts v. Gerking, 111 Ore. 641, 228 Pac.
135 (1924). But cf. Carpenter v. Sibley, 153 Cal. 215, 94 Pac. 879 (1908) (civil
action allowed against the district attorney, but the defense of immunity was raised).
51. See text at pp. 1075-77 infra.
52. See note 18 mipra.
53. Although few decisions were found on this point, there is evidence that the
nol pros is used prior to formal accusation. An Illinois survey in 1929 found that
about 3% of the felony cases entering the preliminary hearing were nol prossed
there. IuaNois CnmsE Suavwy 269 (1929).
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but in one state by statute5 4 and in others by judicial decision it is held
that the prosecutor may enter a nol pros before a formal accusation has
been made.0s Several states, however, have statutes that prohibit such
action.5 68 Where allowed, it would appear that the use of the nol pros is
subject to the same restrictions, such as court approval, as apply when
used to stop prosecution after the formal accusation.
5 7
On the other hand, there are statutes in some states allowing accusa-
tion of felonies by information which seem to give the prosecutor complete
discretion in determining whether or not an information will be filed against
persons held by the magistrate,5 8 although several of these require him to
file a statement with the court, within a specified period, containing his
reasons for a decision not to inform.59 A few also provide for the filing of
an explanatory statement, but add that the court may order the prosecutor
to file the proper information after examination of his statement and the
evidence in the case. ° Only one jurisdiction makes it mandatory for the
prosecutor to file an information against a person held at a hearing."' In
absence of statute the prosecutor may probably simply fail to inform.
In order to protect the rights of an individual who has been held in a
preliminary proceeding, some states have passed statutes limiting the
prosecutor's discretion not to accuse, since his failure to act may result in
the defendant's being bound on the charge indefinitely. Some statutes
provide for dismissal of the charge if a formal accusation62 or a
54. Miss. CODE ANN. § 2566 (1942).
55. State v. Davis, 236 Iowa 740, 19 N.W.2d 655 (1945) ; Foley v. Ham, 102
Kan. 66, 169 Pac. 183 (1917); Gallagher v. Franklin County, 5 County Ct. 431 (C.P.
Franklin County, Pa. 1888). A different result has been reached in the federal
courts. United States v. Scroggins, 27 Fed. Cas. 1000, No. 16,244 (C.C.N.D. Ga.
1879); United States v. Schumann, 27 Fed. Cas. 984, No. 16,235 (C.C.D. Cal.
1866).
56. N.Y. CODE Camr. PRoc. § 671; Nav. ComP. LAws § 11197 (1929); ORa.
Rav. STAT. § 134.150 (1953).
57. See text at note 73 and note 73 infra.
58. COLO. STAT. ANN. c. 48, §460 (1935); KAN. GEN. STAT. §62-804 (1949);
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15:155 (1951) ; NEv. ComP. LAWS § 11334 (1929) ; VT. REv.
STAT. §2380 (1947).
59. COLO. STAT. ANN. c. 48, § 460 (1935); KAN. GEN. STAT. § 62-804 (1949);
N V. ComP. LAWs § 11334 (1929).
60. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-1306 (1948) ; MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 28.981 (1954) ;
MONT. REv. CODES ANT. §§ 94-6205, 94-6206 (1947); NED. REv. STAT. § 29-1606
(1948); N.D. REv. CODE §§ 29-0906, 29-0907 (1943); S.D. CODa § 34.1504 (1939);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-17-2 (1953); WASH. IRV. CODE §§ 10.16.110, 10.16.120
(1951); Wis. STAT. §355.17 (1951); Wyo. ComP. STAT. ANN. § 10-606 (1945).
Arizona provides that if upon examination of the statement and evidence, the court
is not satisfied, it shall order the prosecutor either to file a proper information or to
present the case to the grand jury, as the prosecutor may determine. Arz. CODE
ANN. § 44-504 (1939).
61. CAL. PEN. CODE §809 (1949).
62. CA.- PEN. CODE §§ 739, 1382 (Supp. 1953); IDAHO CoDE ANN. § 19-3501 (1)
(1948) ; IoWA CoDE ANNOTATIONS c. 795, § 1 (1950) ; MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 611.04
(West 1947) ; MONT. Rav. CODES ANN. §§ 94-6204, 94-9501(1) (1947) ; Nav. Comp.
LAWS §11193 (1929); N.Y. CODE Camr. Paoc. §§667, 669; N.D. Rav. CODE
§ 29-1801 (1) (1943); OLA.. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 811 (1937); Oma. Rav. STAT.
§ 134.110 (1953) ; S.D. CODE § 34.2201 (1939) ; TENN. CODE ANN. § 11717 (Williams
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trial 63 does not take place within a stated period from the time the defend-
ant is held by a magistrate. Other jurisdictions meet the problem obliquely
by requiring that the prosecutor file either an information or a statement of
his reasons for not informing within a limited period. The status of the
accused in such states is unclear if the prosecutor simply fails to act.6 4 Of
course, if he presents his reasons for not informing and the court does not
or cannot overrule him, the charges are dismissed. 5 Arguably, the same
result should be reached if he has not acted at the end of the period on the
same theory as the statutes which provide expressly for dismissal. How-
ever, this has not been settled.
The conclusive effect of dismissal either by act of the prosecutor or
lapse of time varies from state to state. Some states' statutes hold that
such dismissal does not bar future prosecution for the same charge; 6 6
others are contra.6 7 In a few it is a bar only if the alleged crime was a
misdemeanor.68 In the absence of statute, the weight of authority is that
dismissal bars further prosecution.69
DISCONTINUANCE OR CHANGING OF A CHARGE: THE NOL PROS
The entrance of a formal accusation against the defendant may not
result in a trial on that particular charge. At common law the attorney
general had absolute power to dismiss a prosecution on his own official
1941); TE:. CODE CRIMr. PROC. ANN. art. 576 (1948); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-51-
1(1) (1953); WASH. REv. CODE §10.37.020 (1951).
New Jersey permits the court, in its discretion, to dismiss a charge if there is
any "undue delay" in bringing the accusation. N.J. R. Camt. P. 3:11-3(c).
Wisconsin compels the court to dismiss a charge if the accusation is not brought
within a specified period after the defendant is held by the magistrate, unless the
court finds that witnesses for the state have been enticed or kept away or prevented
from attending by illness or accident. Wis. STAT. § 355.01 (1951).
63. See text at notes 109-11 and notes 109-11 infra. Limited statutory pro-
tection to individuals held in jail awaiting accusation is given by statutes which pro-
vide that if a jailed person is not accused within a specified period after incarceration
the court shall discharge him from jail, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-10 (1953) ; PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 19, § 781; id. tit. 17, § 473 (Purdon 1930); S.C. CODE § 17-509 (1952),
or admit him to bail, R.I. GEN. LAWS c. 625, § 56 (1938), or the court shall discharge
him from jail unless it appears that material witnesses for the state have been en-
ticed or kept away or prevented from attending by illness or accident. MAss. ANN.
LAWS c. 277, § 15 (1933); MIcH. STAT. ANN. §§ 28.942, 28.966 (1954); VA. CODE
§ 19-137 (1950); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 6176 (1949); Wyo. Comp. STAT. ANN.
§§ 10-518, 10-613 (1945).
64. See Ex parte Trull, 133 Kan. 165, 168, 298 Pac. 775, 777 (1931).
65. N.D. REv. CoDE § 29-0907 (1943) ; UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-17-2 (1953) ; Wis.
STAT. § 355.17 (1951). Even if the statute has no such provision, it is reasonable
to infer that the defendant is to be discharged if the court takes no action on the
statement.
66. N.D. REv. CODE § 29-1806 (1943) ; OiuA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 817 (1937);
S.D. CODE § 34.2203 (1939).
67. F.A. STAT. ANN. §915.01(2) (1944).
68. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1382 (3) (Supp. 1953); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-3506
(1948); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. §94-9507 (1947); NEV. Coan,. LAWS §11199
(1929); N.Y. CODE CRmr. PROC. §673; Om. REV. STAT. §134.140(2) (1953);
UTAH CODE ANN. §77-51-6 (1953); WASH. REv. CODE §10.43.010 (1951).
69. See note 112 infra.
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responsibility.7" In a few states, the prosecutor retains this power,71 but
some jurisdictions have placed the nol pros authority entirely within the
discretion of the court.7 2 Other states, including Pennsylvania, require
court approval of the entry of a nol pros."3 Under such a provision, the
prosecutor's refusal to continue the case will not end the proceeding if the
court appoints a substitute; 74 on the other hand, the court has no power
to dismiss a prosecution over the prosecutor's objection, despite a request
by the injured party 7 6 or a prior agreement with the prosecuting attorney.77
Although the nol pros is an important device in the administration of
the criminal law, there are no statutory criteria governing its use.78 A
study of the use of the nol pros in the Philadelphia criminal courts gives
some indication of the standards used in actual practice. In 1954, 12.4%
of criminal indictments in Philadelphia were disposed of by means of the
nol pros; their distribution among the various types of offenses charged
is shown by Table 11.79 A study of the trial lists prepared by the district
attorney's office during the nine month period from May 1, 1953 to Jan-
uary 31, 1954 gives some indication of why this action was requested as
recorded by the assistant district attorney assigned to prosecute the case.
Table I 80 categorizes the reasons listed for the entrance of the nol pros
during this period.
70. CLARK, op. cit. supra note 17, at 154; Note, 33 CORNELL L.Q. 407 (1948).
71. People v. Newcomer, 284 Ill. 315, 120 N.E. 244 (1918); Denham v. Robin-
son, 72 W. Va. 243, 77 S.E. 970 (1913). LA. Rxv. STAT. ANN. §15:329 (1951).
72. These statutes provide that the nol pros is abolished, but that the court
may dismiss a charge on its own motion or on motion of the prosecuting attorney.
AnIz. CODE ANN. § 44-1506 (1939); CAL. PEN. CODE § 1385 (Supp. 1953); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 19-3504 (1948) ; IOWA CODE ANN. § 795.5 (1950) ; MoNr. REV. CoDE&
ANN. § 94-9505 (1947); NEv. Cox p. LAWS § 11197 (1929); N.Y. CODE CRmI. PRoC.
§ 671; N.D. REv. CODE § 29-1804 (1943); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 815 (1951) ;
ORz. REv. STAT. § 134.150 (1953); S.D. CODE § 34.2204 (1939); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 77-51-4 (1953); WAS H. REv. CODE § 10A6.090 (1951). Kansas simply provides
that the court may dismiss a charge on motion. KAN. GEN. STAT. § 62.1437 (1949).
73. ARm STAT. ANN. §43-1230 (1947) ; COLO. STAT. ANN. c. 48, §463 (1935) ;
DEL. R. Cani. P. 48(a); GA. CODE ANN. § 27-1801 (1953); IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 9-910 (Burns 1933); Ky. Cam:. CODE §243 (Carroll 1948); ME. rEV. STAT..
c. 89, § 117 (1954); Mica. STAT. ANN. §§28.969, 28.942 (1954); OHIo Rnv. CODE
§2941.33 (1953); N.J. R. CRim. P. 3:11-3(a); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §492
(Purdon 1930) ; TENN. CODE ANN. § 11716 (Williams 1934) ; see State v. Costen,
141 Tenn. 539, 213 S.W. 910 (1919) ; TEX. CODE Cimi. PROC. ANN. art. 577 (1954);
Wyo. Comp. STAT. ANN. § 10-823 (1945).
74. Guinther v. Milwaukee, 217 Wis. 334, 258 N.W. 865 (1935).
75. State v. Anderson, 119 Tex. 110, 26 S.W.2d 174 (1930).
76. Commonwealth v. Cundiff, 149 Ky. 37, 147 S.W. 767 (1912).
77. Commonwealth v. Hughes, 153 Ky. 34, 154 S.W. 399 (1913).
78. Ohio provides that the prosecuting attorney may nol pros a charge, with
the court's consent, only for "good cause." OHIO REv. CODE § 2941.33 (1953). Those
jurisdictions which lodge the nol pros power within the discretion of the court
generally provide the vague standard that the power shall be exercised only "in
furtherance of justice' or "for good cause." See statutes cited in note 72 supra.
79. See p. 1082 infra.
80. See p. 1068 infra.
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TABLE I
Reasons for the Entry of the Nol Pros by the Philadelphia District
Attorney's Office, May 1, 1953 to January 31, 1954
Number of
Indictments Percentage of
Reasons Nol Prossed Nol Prossed Bills
Prosecuting Witness Dead 21 1.35
Technical Reasons 43 2.77
Not Sufficient Evidence 91 5.87
Miscellaneous 142 9.16
Lack of Prosecution 404 26.07
Prosecution Withdrawn 488 31.49
No Reasons Given 361 23.29
Total 1550 100.00
The Administrative Function
Observations of the motions for nol pros in the Philadelphia criminal
courts over a four week period and interviews with the personnel of the
district attorney's office indicate that the nol pros performs a variety of
functions. As an administrative tool, the nol pros enables the prosecutor
to correct mistakes made by the grand jury and to clear the dockets of
cases which cannot be tried successfully either because of lack of evidence
or because of the time limitations imposed.81 Technical reasons such as
the statute of limitations, duplication of other bills, or formally defective
indictments may prevent prosecution. Since charges against persons held
by the magistrate are forwarded to the grand jury in Philadelphia without
any screening of the evidence by the district attorney's office, there were
cases in which there was not sufficient evidence to present a prima facie
case. Unless the offense is extremely serious, the charge is nol prossed
to clear the docket without further investigation by the prosecuting attorney.
A more serious administrative problem arises when witnesses for the
commonwealth are unavailable. In a few cases the death of the prosecuting
witness acts as a complete bar to prosecution since the testimony of the
prosecuting witness may be essential to convict. In this situation, the nol
pros is entered upon proof of death. In many cases the failure of the
commonwealth's witnesses to appear may result in a lack of prosecution.
Although the nol pros was entered in some of the less serious offenses for
this reason on the first listing, most of the cases are relisted at least once,
and more serious offenses are relisted many times. Generally, the office
is hesitant to enter a nol pros on the first listing without consulting the
prosecuting witness. In one case, the charge was for the theft of articles
worth seventy-five cents. Although defendant had several witnesses pre-
pared to testify to his innocence, the prosecutor moved for a continuance
81. See text at and following note 105 infra.
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to consult the prosecuting witness. Where it is extremely doubtful that
the witnesses will ever appear, however, it might be better to dismiss the
case. One case involved a charge of attempted robbery by two men with
long criminal records. The only witnesses had returned to Sweden, and
information from the Swedish Consulate indicated that their return to this
country was extremely doubtful. Despite this, the prosecutor refused to
move for a nol pros and left the defendants to their remedy for failure to
receive a speedy trial.8 2 Although the seriousness of the crime and the
defendant's record deserve consideration, the failure to dismiss such a
charge defeats one of the important purposes of the nol pros.
A similar problem arises when the defendant cannot be found. In
some of these cases, listed in the miscellaneous category, it was known that
the defendants were in another jurisdiction. Unless the offense is quite
serious, this generally results in the entry of a nol pros and a forfeiture of
bail.
A Tool of Selectivity
In addition to its administrative function, the nol pros enables the
prosecutor to dismiss a case due to changed conditions and to exercise
some degree of selectivity of prosecution. In many cases the prosecuting
witness has requested that the charges be dropped because the difficulty
with the accused has been adjusted. As indicated by Table I, prosecution
withdrazwn constitutes the most common reason for the use of the nol pros.
Many of the charges for various forms of assault and battery are a result
of marital or extra-marital spats. Although the complaining party may
have been injured, by the time the case is brought to trial the use of crim-
inal process is regretted. Similarly, in the case of neighborhood fights,
the defendant's signing of a peace bond is generally satisfactory to the
complainant. Unless dangerous weapons were used by the accused, the
charge is generally nol prossed at the request of the complaining party.
Accusations of passing bad checks and statutory rape are also common
subjects of private compromise. In many instances, criminal process is
used simply as a form of private relief. By the time of the trial the desired
settlement generally has been made, whereupon the complainant has no wish
to prosecute. Where the defendant has merely promised restitution, how-
ever, the request to discontinue the case is generally refused until restitu-
tion is actually made. A related problem arises in cases where the em-
ployee "borrows" property of his employer. Although this may be tech-
nically a criminal conversion, these charges are generally nol prossed where
it appears that the complainant is using criminal process merely to effect
recovery of his property.
Where a private compromise or recovery in a civil suit has been made,
the complainant has little interest in further prosecution. Even if he can
be persuaded to continue the criminal case, his apathy is often so pro-
nounced that he is an extremely weak witness. In doubtful cases the
82. Ibid.
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prosecutor may find it expedient to accept the compromise or even to par-
ticipate in the settlement. This form of compromise has been recognized
as an important part of the administration of the criminal law in the case
of misdemeanors for which the complainant has a civil remedy.sma
Some states, including Pennsylvapia, have given the court or the com-
mitting magistrate the power to djsrfiiss misdemeanors on a statement of
the injured party that the dispute has been settled.8 Since a record of
similar complaints against the defendant may necessitate a prosecution, it
might be better to subject the dismissal of these cases by the court or
magistrate to the prosecutor's concurrence.
8 4
A more questionable practice is the acceptance of guilty pleas to an
offense lesser than, but included within the original charge. Although the
trial lists in the Philadelphia office showed exceptionally little of this
type of bargaining,8 5 it may be more common in other jurisdictions due to
the desire to maintain a favorable record of convictions and the administra-
tive difficulty of conducting a full trial for all accusations."" Many con-
siderations enter into the use of the nol pros for this purpose. Technical
problems of proof may make conviction on the original charge uncertain.8 7
In the case of the multiple offender, the prosecutor may believe that the
jury would consider the punishment too exacting for the acts in question. 8
The prosecutor may have a similar reaction to cases in which the defend-
ant's youth, his lack of a previous record, and the possibility of restitution
make punishment for the original charge appear unnecessarily severe.8 9
Although acceptance saves the state the cost of prosecuting the case
in what may be a long and expensive trial, it precludes society from
imposing its full sanction upon the convicted criminal. To the extent
that a lesser sentence accompanies the plea of guilty than would be im-
posed upon conviction of the original charge, the deterrent effect of penal
sanctions is reduced. The use of this device would permit individualized
treatment of the offender, but it is not clear that the prosecutor is as well
qualified to make the requisite evaluation as are other state officials.
Moreover, acceptance of the plea leaves little on the record for public
.82a. See MIcHAEL & WECHsLER, CRimINAL LAW AND ITS ADmINIsTRATIoN 533
(1940).
83. These states are Ariz., Cal., Idaho, Iowa, Mass., Me., Mich., Mont, Nev.,
N.Y., N.D., Okla., Ore., Pa., R.I., S.D., Utah, Va., Wash.
84. The court or magistrate may dismiss without the concurrence of the prose-
cutor under these statutes. See note 83 supra.
8. In only a few of the cases listed under the miscellaneous caption was the
reason stated that the nol pros was entered due to the guilty plea to another offense
In about a dozen of those bills for which no reason was given, the defendant had
pleaded guilty to a lesser offense.
86. MoL.Y, op. cit. supra note 5, at 156-165, 187-88.
87. Weintraub & Tough, Lesser Plea. Considered, 32 J. Cans. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
506, 513 (1942).
88. Id. at 510.
89. Id. at 521-29.
90. See MoraY, op. cit. supra note 5, at 187-88.
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scrutiny and is -arely subject to, review "by. a- higher cotirt,91 but wins
political friends and builds a -high ,record -of convictions to- exhibit to
that* element of the community which.-.insists on a strict enforcement of the
law.
A similai problem it the nol "prossing of minor charges against de--
fendants who are on parole. In' some instances these 'charges. were nol
prossed -when the'back time on the paroled conviction was much greater
than the maximum penalty on the immediate 'charge. Although a con-
viction would force the -defendant to -serve a much -longer-sentence than
the maximum penalty, provided for- the new offense, such offense casts
doubt' bn the defendant's 'suitability for 'parole' and the.problem- shotild
bh placed under the administratiofi of thd parole officers.
On the other hand, there are some' circumstances in which the prose-
ctitor's discretion to nol' pros seemns' desirable in terms of selective prose-
cution. Where the defendant has a history'of psychopathic or psychiatric
disorders 'and has been committed t6 an institution for the insane, for ex-
ample, 'the indictment was sometimes dismissed. In a few instances a
nol pros was entered where 'the'accused' was extremely ill and unable to
stand trial for' the charges placed' against him. In this type of case, the
prosecutor must be careful not to nol pros cases where the defendant is
only temporarily incompetent; where it is doubtful whether or not the
accused is incompetent, the more appropriate procedure would be a motion
for a hearing on that issue., Moreover, whether the situation is only tem-
porary or permanent, it certainly does not establish irresponsibility for the
crime itself. Properly employed, the nol pros removes from the docket
cases in which society no longer has any desire to prosecute because of the
condition of the accused, without foreclosing further prosecution should
the defendant unexpectedly recover.92 '
The Requirement of, Court Approval
The prosecutor's discretion in the use of the nol pros is an enormous
power in the hands of one public'official. Its use is generally not subject
to publicity and public scrutiny. Unbridled, it enables a local prosecuting
attorney to guarantee almost absolute immunity from the sanctions of
the law to any class of persons, should he desire to employ it in that
manner. In the hands of a corrupt official it can virtually stymie law
enforcement. Some states have made the entry of a nol pros subject to
91. Id. at 189-90.
92. Once jeopardy has attached, the entry of a nol pros without the consent of the
defendant bars further prosecution on the same charge. Mount v. State, 14 Ohio
295 (1846) ; State v. Richardson, 47 S.C. 166, 25 S.E. 220 (1896) ; GA. COna ANN.
§ 27-1801 (1948); LA. Rxv. STAT. ANN. §§ 15:330, 331 (1951); N.J. R. Cam. P.
3:11-3(a). If jeopardy has not attached, the accusation may be reinstated during the
same term of court with court consent. Condos v. Superior Court, 29 Ariz. 186,
239 Pac. 1032 (1925); State v. Lenon, 331 Mo. 591, 56 S.W.2d 378 (1932). If
furher prosecution is desired after that term has elapsed, a new accusation must be
brought. State v. Dix, 18 Ind. App. 472, 48 N.E. 261 (1897).
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court approval.9 Although such a law was in effect in Philadelphia when
this study was made, its effect as a check on the prosecutor is difficult to
appraise. In only three instances was it recorded that the court had
refused a motion for nol pros, and in a few cases it was recorded that the
nol pros was entered at the court's suggestion. 94  Although the court's
reasons for refusal were not given, serious offenses were involved in two
of the cases and in these the basis for the motion was the inability of the
prosecution to locate its witnesses.
The apparent infrequency of court action, in addition to the evidence
of the rest of the study, may be indicative that the prosecutor's discretion
in entering the nol pros is conscientiously and intelligently used by the
Philadelphia District Attorney's office. Although judicial control-may be
a contributing factor to the exceptionally few -number of bargainings
for pleas of guilty to lessor offenses,95 this is probably more attributable
to the district attorney's policy against this type of compromise. Since
the court has neither the means nor the time to investigate the advisability
of discontinuing the prosecution, court approval may be a perfunctory
operation in many cases.98 However, the necessity of requesting the
nol pros in open court and the requirement of court approval may operate
to restrain the more apparent abuses without unduly limiting the ad-
vantages derived from the entry of a nol pros.
CONTROL OF THE CRIMINAL CALENDAR
The prosecutor's control of the criminal calendar in many jurisdic-
tions places the time of trial within the discretion of the prosecutor, 7
and in some cities, he may also select the judge he wishes for the in-
dividual caseY8 The trial court may have the actual power to control
the calendar, 99 but the prosecuting attorney has long performed this
93. See note 73 supra. State v. Veterans of Foreign Wars, 223 Iowa 1146, 274
N.W. 916 (1937). But see Commonwealth ex rel. Thor v. Ashe, 138 Pa. Super.
222, 11 A.2d 173 (1940).
94. Only three were recorded on the trial lists during the nine month period
studied. Of course, there may have been many more which the assistant district
attorneys failed to record.
95. See note 85 supra.
96. See Timmins v. Hale, 122 Ore. 24, 42-43, 256 Pac. 770, 776 (1927). See
Littleton, Acceptance of Lesser Pleas-A Matter of Honest Discretion, 14 THE
PANEL 1 (No. 3, 1936).
97. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEnURE FROm ARRSr To APPEAL 383-84 (1947).
98. Id. at 384.
99. See Furia The Right of the District Attorney to Prepare the Criminal
Calendar, 26 Tmnm. L.Q. 128, 131 (1953). There is some authority that this is the
function of the prosecutor. State v. Silvius, 22 R.I. 322, 47 Atl. 888 (1900); see
Orabona v. Linscott, 49 R.I. 443, 144 Atl. 52 (1928). The following states place
this power in the court or provide that the cases shall be listed for trial according
to a fixed statutory scheme. Ariz., Ala., Ark., Cal., Del., Ga., Idaho, Ind., Iowa,
Ky., La., Minn. Miss., Mont., Neb., Nev., Ohio, Tex., Utah, Va., Wash. and
W. Va. In N.Y. and Okla., the only provisions are those giving the trial courts of
inferior criminal jurisdiction control of their calendars. Mass. and N.C. vest this
power in the prosecutor.
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function 100 since his familiarity with the complexities of each case enables
him to estimate the time required for adequate preparation and the ap-
proximate length of the trial. If the court sets the date for trial,101 the
prosecutor may be forced to request continuances, which are apparently
granted in most instances,'02 since a failure to grant these continuances
would force the prosecutor to try poorly prepared cases or to dismiss a large
number of prosecutions by means of the nol pros.1°0 However, unre-
stricted control of the criminal calendar may foster inefficiency and pro-
crastination in the preparation of cases, and the power to distribute cases
among the presiding judges places the defendant at an unfair disadvantage
since he is unable" to, veto the prosecutor's action or propose his own
preferences.1o 4
The constitutional right to a speedy trial 105 does not adequately pro-
tect the defendant nor deter the prosecutor's delay in bringing the accused
to trial. The terms of the guarantee are vague and ambiguous.108 If it is
violated, in the absence of statute, the defendant is not entitled to have the
charges dismissed but must bring mandamus to compel his trial.10 7 If held
in jail, however, habeas corpus will lie to obtain his releasel'0 In several
states, statutory remedies vest discretionary power in the trial court to
dismiss an accusation if there is an unreasonable delay in bringing it to
trial; 109 others require the court to dismiss the accusation if the defend-
ant is not brought to trial within a specified time after accusation unless
good cause to the contrary is shown.110 A few states provide that the
100. Note, 48 COL L. REv. 613, 615 (1948).
101. This was in practice in New York County from 1910 to 1922. N.Y. Sess.
Laws 1909, c. 542. Such a" critical breakdown of the calendar resulted that the
statute was repealed. See Note, 48 COL. L. Rxv. 613, 616 (1948).
102. THE MIssoURI CRImE SuRvEY 168 (1926).
103. ORFIELD, op. cit. supra note 97, at 383.
104. See State ex rel. Palmer v. Atkinson, 116 Fla. 366, 371, 156 So. 726, 728
(1934). Cf. Davis v. State, 44 Tex. 523, 524 (1876).
105. The constitutions of all but six states: Massachusetts, New Hampshire,
North Carolina, Oregon, Nevad and New York, guarantee the right to a speedy
trial. Of these, only Nevada and New York guarantee the right by statute. NEv.
ComP. LAWS § 10654(1) (1929); N.Y. CODE Caim. PRoc. §8(1). There has been
no decision on the application of U.S. CONsT. amend. VI to state proceedings.
Comment, 39 J. CRIm. L. & CRmioLoGY 193,,200 (1948).
106. See HEL.ER, THE SixTr AmENDMENT 60 (1951).
107. State v. Banks, 111 La. 22, 35 So. 370 (1903); People v. Foster, 126
Mich. 247, 246 N.W. 60 (1933); Hicks v. Boyne, 236 Mich. 689, 211 N.W. 35
(1926). Contra: In re Miller, 66 Colo. 361, 180 Pac. 749 (1919). See Comment
39 J. CRim. L;. & CRIMNOLOGY 193, 194-95 (1948).
108. In re Deslovers, 35 R.I. 248, 86 Atl. 657 (1913).
109. DEI. R. Cum. P. 48(b) (If there is unnecessary delay in trial, the court
may dismiss the prosecution). LA. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 15:8 (1951) provides that
if three years, in the case of felonies, or two years, in the case of misdemeanors,
have elapsed from the accusation, it is the prosecutor's duty to nol pros the charge;
if he fails to nol pros, the court may do so; N.J. R. Cmrm. P. 3:11-3(b), permits
the assignment judge, at any time after six months from the return of the accusation,
to direct that a case be tried on a specific day; if the prosecutor fails to comply, the
court may dismiss.
110. ARiz. CODE ANN. § 44-1503 (1949) ; CAL. PEN. CODE-§-1382 (Supp. 1953) ;
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-3501(2) (1948) ; MiNN. STAT. ANw §(611.04 (West 1947) ;
MoNT. REv. CODES ANN. § 94-9501 (1947); Nar. CO Lpws § 11194 (1929);
N.Y. CODE CRiM. Paoc. §668; N.D. REv. CODE §29-1801(2) (1943); OHIO Rv.
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period- in -which. a defendant -must be -tried begins -at -the dte -of the
magistrate's hearing. 111
Where further prosecution will be barred," 2 dismissal. within a speci-
fied period may operate as an effective deterrent to delay. In a majority
of jurisdictions,- however, dismissal is not automatic, hut can be effected
only if the defendant makes a timely demand for trial,113 and some states
specifically provide that the period of .limitation runs- only from the de-
fendant's demand.1 4  Moreover, .some states provide not for dismissal
but only for the release I'l or bail 116 of a defendant whose trial has been
delayed beyond a fixed period of time. Although this protects the accused
irom prolonged imprisonment, it may have a negligible effect- onr the
prosecutor's diligence in speeding trial.
CODE §2945.71 (1-953); Ox"sA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §812 (1937); Oaa.,REv. STAT.
§ 134.120 (1953); TENN. CODE ANN. §'11717 (Williams 1934); UTAH CODE ANN.
§77-51-1(27) (1953); WAsH. REv. CODE §10.46.010 (1951). In Iowa the court
can continue the accusation only three terms beyond the limitation period on the
basis of good cause. IowA CODE ANN. § 795.3 (1946).
In many of these jurisdictions, good cause- ig limited to delay due to ihe de-
fendant's application; IND. ANN. STAT. §§91402, 9-1403 (Burns 1942)-; S.D. CODE
§ 34.2202 (1939) ; Wyo. Comp. STAT. ANN. § 10-1312 (1945), or on one of the follow-
ing grounds: insufficient time to bring the accused to trial, IND. ANN. STAT.
§§ 9-1402, 9-1403 (Burns 1942); K.. GEN. STAT. §§ 62-1431, 62-1432 (1949);
Mo. ANN. STAT. &§ 545.890, 545.900 (Vernon 1949); Witnesses for the state were
prevented from attending by sickness or accident, VA. CODE § 19-165 (1950) ; W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 6210 (1949) ; the attendance of witnesses was prevented by the defend-
ant, FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 915.01 (1),(2) (1941). Many of these statutes permit the
court to grant a short, continuance if it is shown that the prosecutor may be able
to obtain material evidence which reasonable efforts had failed to uncover. ILL.
ANN. STAT. c. 38, § 748 (1936); IND. ANN. STAT. §,9-1403 (Bums 1942); KAN.
GEN. STAT. § 62-1433 (1949); Mo. ANN. STArI. § 545.910 (Vernon 1949).; MONT.
REV. CoDEs ANN. § 94-9502 (1947) ; Okmo REV. CODE § 2945.73 (1953) ; S.D. CODE
§ 34.2202 (1939) ; Wyo. Comp. STAT. ANN. § 10-1314 .(1945).
111. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§915.01(1),(2) (1943); ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 34, §748
(1936).
112. Dismissal of the accusation under these statutes is generally held to be a bar
to another prosecution. People v. Allen, 368 Ill. 368, 14 N.E.2d 397 (1937);
People ex rel. Nagel v. Heider, 225 Ill. 347, 80 N.E. 291 (1907); State v. Wear,
145 Mo. 162, 46 S.W. 1099 (1898). See Foreman v. State, 214 Ind. 79, 81-82, 14
N.E.2d -546, 547 (1938). Contra: People v. Henwood, 65 Colo. 66, 179 Pac. 874
(1919). In some states, this is specifically provided by statute. FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 915.01(2) (1941) ; GA. CODE ANN. §27-1901 (1953) ; OHIO REV. CODE § 2945.73
(1953); VA. CODE § 19-165 (Supp. 1954); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 6210 (1949);
N.J. R. C m. P. 3:11-3(b). Contra: N.D. REv. CODE §29-1806 (1943); ORLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 817 (1953). Arizona provides that a further prosecution can
be made only by leave of court. Amz. CODE ANN. § 44-1585 (1940).
113. People v. Klinger, 319 Ill. 275, 149 N.E. 799 (1925); State v. Slorah,
118 Me. 203, 106 Atl. 768 (1919). Contra: State v. Rosenberg, 71 Ore. 389, 142
Pac. 624 (1914). See 15 U. OF DEraoiT L.J. 88. 89 (1952).
114. GA. CODE ANN. §27-1901 (1953); ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 38, §748 (1936);
People v..Suitalsld, 331 Ill. App. 31, 72 N.E.2d 447 (1947). The Illinois provision
applies only to. those defendants on bail; if the defendant is jailed by the magistrate,
he must be brought to trial within four months of incarceration or the charge
is to be dismissed.
115. CoLO. STAT. ANN. c. 48, § 485 (1935); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.966 (1954);
N.C. GEN. STAr. § 15-10 (1953); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 781 (Purdon 1930);
S.C. CODE § 17-509 Qi952).
116. MASS. ANN., LAws c. 277, § 72 (1952) ; ME. REv. STAT. c. 148, § 9 (1954).;
R.I. GEN. LAWS c. 625, § 57 (1938); Wis. STAT. § 355.10 (1953).
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Automatic dismissal of the charge at a specified time after the magis-
trate's hearing or formal accusation would effectively control unnecessary
delays without sacrificing the prosecutor's convenience in setting the time
of trial.. However, the operative effect of such automatic dismissal may
conflict with the safeguard of requiring court approval of the use of the nol
pros as well as most restrictions on the prosecutor's discretion to dismiss
charges, since the prosecutor could accomplish the same thing simply by
failing to act. Fairness to the accused at least demands that the power to
assign cases among the judges be given to someone other than the pros-
ecutor. Reasonable estimates of the time required for trial might easily be
obtained from the prosecuting attorney so that, once the calendar was
prepared, a presiding judge could distribute the cases without a serious loss
of administrative efficiency.' 1 7
CONTROL OF THE PROSECUTOR
As an elected official, the prosecutor in exercising discretion is per-
haps best controlled by the forces of public opinion. Where an aroused
public insists on the enforcement of a particular statute, a thorough
prosecution is likely." 8 In many cases, however, an exercise of discre-
tion in accordance with the desires of the community enables the prose-
cutor, by failing to prosecute, to effect a virtual repeal of state laws which
are disfavorable to his constitutents:1 9 The extent to which these and
other abuses of discretion can be controlled depends upon the efficacy of
the removal procedure and the powers which the state government may
exercise over the local prosecutor.
Removal Procedures
In nearly all states, the local prosecutor is subject to removal upon
action of the state legislature. Some states provide for impeachment; 120
others allow a removal simply upon vote of the legislative body.121 In a
few, the legislature by a two-thirds vote sends a recommendation to the
governor who may 12 or must '2 act to comply with that recommen-
dation. These methods seem to be an'ineffective means of control,
since convincing the requisite number of the legislators that a local prose-
117. Such a rule has been adopted in Kings County of New York. See
McDonald v. Goldstein, 191 Misc. 863, 83 N.Y.S.2d 620 (Sup. Ct 1948).
118. See Baker, supra note 36, at 784.
119. See, e.g., the factual situation in Wilbur v. Howard, 70 F. Supp. 930
(E.D. Ky. 1947).
120. E.g., AR. CoNsT. art. XV, § 1; MIcE. CoNsT. art. IX, § 1; PA. CONST.
art VI, § 3.
121. MD. CONsT. art. V, §7 (two-thirds vote of senate on recommendation
of attorney general) ; TENN. CoNsT. art. VI, § 6 (two-thirds vote of each house);
WASH. CoNsT. art. IV, § 9 (three-fourths vote of each house).
122. ARk. CoNsT. art. XV, § 3; Dat.. CoNsT. art. III, § 13; Am. CoNsT. art. IX,
§5.
123. PA. CONST. art. VI, § 4.
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cutor should be removed would be extremely difficult. The district repre-
sentative may be in allegiance with the prosecutor and would have a
great amount of influence in the legislature, and representatives from
other districts may be extremely hesitant to remove a local prosecutor
without an overwhelming showing that immediate removal is necessary.
Many states have provided for less cumbersome procedures. A local
trial, with or without a jury, on charges of misconduct is a common pro-
vision as indicated by Tables III and IV.124 However, both judge and
jury may be subject to local political pressures which may strongly in-
fluence the result. Time consuming motions by the accused and his re-
course to appeal may delay removal for years. Removal by the governor
after notice and hearing '5 is a more speedy procedure, but may be
equally subject to political pressures. Removal may be effected in Massa-
chusetts 12' and Missouri 127 by means of a petition to the highest court
of the state. This permits a disposal of the substantive issue in relative
freedom from political pressures and eliminates the delay of time consuming
appeals.
Where removal procedures are inadequate, prosecutions for misde-
meanors in office and the threat of disbarment may aid in the control of
the prosecutor. Most of the grounds for removal are also statutory mis-
demeanors in many states as shown by Table V,128 and in other states, the
common law misdemeanor of official misconduct 129 may still be in effect.' 30
In some states, as is indicated in the tables, the court may or must remove
the prosecutor upon conviction of one of these offenses. However, such
a prosecution is a poor substitute for effective removal procedures. Since
a corrupt motive is an essential element of these crimes,' 3 ' conviction can
124. See pp. 1083-85 infra.
125. ME. Rxv. STAT. C. 89, § 112 (1954) (accusation by verified complaint of any
person; grounds for removal are violation of any statute, failure to perform duties
faithfully and efficiently) ; MicH. STAT. ANN. § 6.696 (1936) (accusation by verified
complaint of any person; grounds for removal are misconduct, wilful neglect of
duty); MINN. STAT. ANNOTATIONS § 351.03 (1946) (gounds for removal are mal-
feasance and nonfeasance) ; N.D. REv. CODE §§ 44-1101, 44-1103 (1943) (accusation
by verified complaint of five qualified electors or by complaint of attorney general;
grounds for removal are misconduct, malfeasance, neglect of duty, gross in-
competency); N.Y. CoNsT. art. IX, § 5; S.D. CoDE §48.0203 (1939) (accusation
by governor or complaint of any person; grounds for removal are wilful failure to
perform duty, wilful refusal to perform duty, wilful neglect to perform duty, gross
incompetency, being guilty of any violation of the law); Wis. CoNsT. art. VI,
§ 4 (accusation is by verified complaint of any taxpayer; grounds for removal are
inefficiency, neglect of duty, misconduct, malfeasance); Wis. STAT. §§ 17.09(5),
17.15(3), 17.16(2) (1953).
126. MAss. ANN. LAws c. 211, §4 (Supp. 1954).
127. State v. Wallach, 353 Mo. 312, 182 S.W2d 313 (1944); State ex inf.
McKitrich v. Wymore, 345 Mo. 169, 132 S.W.2d 979 (1939).
128. See p. 1086 infra.
129. See MILLER, CRIMiNAL LAW § 162 (1934).
130. State v. Winne, 12 N.J. 152, 96 A.2d 63 (1953).
131. See State v. Wheatley, 192 Md. 44, 47-48, 63 A2d 644, 646 (1949) (wilful
and corrupt); Commonwealth v. Brownmiller, 141 Pa. Super. 107, 120, 14 A2d
907, 913 (1940) (wilfull and corrupt); Commonwealth v. Hubbs, 137 Pa. Super.
244, 248 8 A.2d 618, 620 (1939) (evil and corrupt). Contra: State v. Winne, 12
N.J. 152, 96 A.2d 63 (1953). See also 1 Bisxop, CRrmIIAL LAW §460 (9th ed.
1923).
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only control the more extreme abuses of discretion.1' Since many states
require that the prosecutor be an attorney duly admitted to the bar of the
state courts,la disbarment would at least prevent his re-election 134 and
might be used as a basis for inducing the legislature to remove the prose-
cutor.
13 5
The Attorney General
At common law, the public prosecuting official was the attorney gen-
eral, who exercised wide powers of supervision over all criminal investiga-
tions and prosecutions. 36 Although in some instances the actual prosecu-
tor was merely a private citizen, the attorney general apparently could
assume personal control of such proceedings as he saw fit.'"7
In states in which the.attorney general retains his common-law powers
in addition to those enumerated by statute, he may exercise concurrent
powers with the local prosecuting attorney in the' initiation and prosecu-
tion of criminal cases,138 and it has been held that he may, at his discretion,
supersede and replace the local prosecutor.139 In a few states, however,
the attorney general has no powers overlapping those given to the local
prosecutor,140 and in others, the attorney general possesses only those
powers specifically given to him by statute or constitution.'
4'
132. See Comment, 102 U. oF PA. L. Rw. 547 (1954).
133. IowA CODE ANN. §336.1 (1949); IDAHO CODE ANN. §31-2601, (1939);
Mo. ANN. STAT. §56.010 (Vernon 1949); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, §246 (Purdon
Supp. 1954). In absence of a constitutional or statutory provision, it has been held
that the local prosecutor must be an attorney duly admitted to the bar of the state.
Enge v. Cass, 28 N.D. 219, 148 N.W. 607 (1914).
134. Danforth v. Egan, 23 S.D. 43, 119 N.W. 1021 (1909). Disbarment itself
is not equivalent to removal. See Snyder's case, 301 Pa. 276, 288-89, 152 At. 33, 36-
37 (1930).
135. In Kentucky, for example, after several unsuccessful attempts at removal
(see Northcutt v. Howard, 279 Ky. 219, 130 S.W.2d 70 (1939) ; Attorney General
v. Howard, 297 Ky. 488, 180 S.W.2d 415 (1944)), a federal district court was per-
suaded to disenroll a state prosecutor for misconduct in the performance of his
official state duties. Wilbur v. Howard, 70 F. Supp. 930 (E.D. Ky. 1947), moot
on appeal, 166 F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1948).
136. AgcHBOLD. CRIMINAL PLEADING, EvlDENcE AND PRACrIcE 103 (31st ed.,
Butler & Garsia 1943).
137. See JACKsoN, THE MACHINERY OF JUSTICE IN ENGLAND 108 (1940), PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 3432 (Purdon 1930).
138. People v. Gibson, 53 Colo. 231, 125 Pac. 531 (1912); Commonwealth v.
Kozlowsky, 238 Mass. 379, 131 N.E. 207 (1921); State ex rel. Young v. Robinson,
101 Minn. 277, 112 N.W. 269 (1907); State ex rel. Ford v. Young, 54 Mont. 401,
170 Pac. 947 (1918).
139. State v. Finch, 128 Kan. 665, 280 Pac. 910 (1928) ; Commonwealth ex rel.
Minerd v. Margiotti, 325 Pa. 17, 188 At1. 524 (1936).
140. E.g., State v. Ehrlick, 65 W. Va., 700, 64 S.E. 935 (1909).
141. Westover v. State, 66 Ariz. 145, 185 P.2d 315 (1947); State v. Home
Brewing Co., 182 Ind. 75, 105 N.E. 909 (1914); Cosson v. Bradshaw, 160 Iowa
296, 141 N.W. 1062 (1913) ; State v. Davidson, 33 N.M. 664, 275 Pac. 373 (1929) ;
State v. Seattle Gas & Elec. Co., 28 Wash. 488, 68 Pac. 946 (1902); State v.
Snyder, 172 Wis. 415, 179 N.W. 579 (1920).
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A common provision in states, that specifically enumerate the attorney
general's powers is the power. to, institute prosecution in cases .on. which
the local prosecutor has failed to act.1' Many state statutes approach the
common law more closely by allowing the attorney general to supersede
the local prosecutor in any prosecution and to any extent necessary.
14
Some jurisdictions give the attorney general a limited power of assist-
ance,'44 which enables him to participate actively in the prosecution of
142. ARiz. CODE ANN. § 4-601 (a) (2) .(Supp. 1952); CAL. CoNsT. art. V, § 21;
IOWA CODE ANN. §13.2(2) (1946); LA. Ray. STAT. §15:23 (1951); ME. Ray.
STAT. C. 20, § 9 (1954) ; NEn. Rhv. STAT. § 84-204.'(1943) ; NEv. Comp. ,LAws § 7312
(1929); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 4-3-2(b) (1953); X.D. Rav. CODE §54-1202 (1943);
S.D. CODE § 34.0403 (1939); Vr. R. STAT. §463 (1947). In Arizona, Nevada
and New Mexico, the attorney general must exercise this power when directed
by the governor. In Iowa, the attorney general is to exercise this power when
ordered to do so by the governor, legislature, or the governor's executive council.
In a few states, this may be done only when directed by the governor. IDAHO CODE
ANN. §31-227 (Supp. 1953); MD. CONST. art. V, §3; OKLA. STAT; ANN. tit. 74,
§ 18(e) (Supp. 1954); VA. CODE § 2-90 (1950). Idaho also provides that the at-
torney general is to initiate and prosecute criminal cases'when directed to do so
by the legislature.
143. In some states, this may be done at the attorney general's discretion.
ALA. CODE tit. 55, §235 (1940); CAL. POL CODE. §§470(5), 477, 478 (1944);
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§15:23, 15:156 (1951); ME. REv. STXT. c.'20, §9 (1954);
NEB. REv. STAT. §84-203 (1943); NEv. ComP. LAWS §7316(c) (1929); S.C. CODE
§1-237(2) (1952); S.D. CODE §§34.0403, 55.1501(2) (1939); VT. REv. STAT.
§ 454 (1947). Of these, Nebraska, Nevada, South Carolina and South Dakota compel
the attorney general to supersede the local prosecutor when directed by the governor.
NEB. REv. STAT. §84-205(9) (1943); NEv. ComP. LAWS §7316(c) (1929); S.C.
CODE § 1-233 (1952); S.D. CODE § 55.1501(2) (1939). Nebraska also requires the
attorney general to supersede when directed to do so by. the legislature. NEB.
REv. STAT. §84-205(9) (1943). South Carolina and South Dakota also provide
that the attorney general is to supersede the local prosecutor upon the direction
of either branch of the legislature. S.C. CODE § 1-233 (1952) ; S.D. CODE § 55.1501 (2)
(1939). New Mexico provides that the attorney general is to supersede the local
prosecutor if he fails or refuses to perform his duty, and, if after a thorough in-
vestigation, the grand jury deems supersedure necessary. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 4-3-3
(1953).
In other states, this may be done only when so directed by the. governor or
some other state officer or body. By the governor: GA. CODE ANN. § 40-1610
(1949); KAN. GEN. STAT. § 75-702 (1949); MD. CoNsT. art. V, § 3; MASS. ANN.
LAws c. 12, §3 (1952); MINN. STAT. ANN. §8.01 (1946); N.H. REv. LAWS
c. 24, §8 (1942); N.J. STAT. ANN. §52:17A-4(F) (1955); N.Y. ExEc. LAW
§ 63(2); N.C. GEN. STAT.' § 114-2(1) (1952); OHIO REv. CODE §§ 109.02, 2939.10
(1953); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 18(b) (Supp. 1954) ; OnE. REv. STAT. §§ 180.070,
180.080 (1953) ; VA. CODE §2-90 (1950) ; Wis. STAT. §14.53(1) (1953). Of these,
Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, North Caroliha, Oklahoma, Ohio, Oregon and Wis-
consin also require the attorney general to supersede the local prosecutor when
requested to do so by the legislature. N6w Jersey requires the attorney general to
supersede when directed by the assignment judge of the superior court or the county
governing body. N.J. STAT. ANN. §52:17A-4(F) (1955). Oregon permits super-
sedure when the attorney general is so requested by any state officer, board or comms-
sion. ORE- REv. STAT. § 180.060(d) (1953). The attorney general may supersede when
so directed by the judge of the criminal court, N.D. REv. CODE §§ 11-1606, 54-1204
(1943), or by the president judge of the criminal court, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71,
§ 297 (Purdon 1942). Washington provides that upon request of the governor, the
attorney general shall investigate violations of the law. If after such investigation,
the attorney general believes 'that the prosecutor has failed or neglected to prosecute
criminal violations, the attorney general shall direct any action he deems advisable.
If the prosecutor fails to comply, the attorney general shall supersede. WASH.
Rm. CODE §43.10.090 (1951).
144. ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 14, §4(4) (1951); IND. ANN. STAT. §49-1924 (Burns
1951); MISS. CODE ANN. § 3845 (1942); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 27.030 (Vernon 1951);
9PROSEGUTOR'S DISCRETION
cases.. Others provide that he may supervise the activities- of the pros-
ecutor,1' which, without the power of assistance, would permit only direc-
tion of a most-general nature. Where he has both of these latter powers,
4
however, a limited supersedure might be effected in some cases by gaining
entry to the prosecution. through the power of assistance and control -by
"means of his power of supervision. 147
- The sporadic use of these statutes has produced' little state control
over the local prosecuting attorney. 48  The attorney general's powers in
the administration of the criminal law are largely incidental to his non-
criminal activities, which constitute the bulk of the work of his office. 149
Since duties to exercise these powers are only rarely imposed,' 50 the
attorney general is unlikely to exercise much control over. the local prose-
cutor.
More effective state control over the local prosecutor has long been
advocated. Delaware and Rhode Island have made all prosecutions the
responsibility of the state attorney general for many years.'"'. Similar
plans have been proposed for adoption in other states.152 Such centraliza-
N.D. REv. CODE § 54-1201(4),(5) (1943). In New Mexico the attorney general
is to assist the prosecutor only .when so directed by the governor. N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 4-3-2(i) (1953). In addition, Maryland requires the attorney general to
assist the prosecutor when so directed by the legislature. MD. CoNsT. art. V, § 3.
The attorney general of Maine can assist the prosecutor o~ily irk the prosecution
of treason and murder cases. ME. Rxv. STAT. c. 20, § 9 (1954). In South Carolina
he can assist only in the presentation of capital cases to the grand jury. S.C. CODE
§ 1-237(1) (1952). In Vermont he may assist only in the preparation of indictments
arid informations and appear before the grand jury. VT. REv. STAT. § 455 (1947).
145. ALA. CODE tit. 55, §236 (1940); FLA. STAT. ANN¢. § 16.08 (1943); IowA
CODE ANN. § 132(7) (1949); LA. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 15:23 (1951); Micn. STAT.
ANN. §3.183 (1952); Nay. ComP. LAWS §7316(b) (1929); N.H.-REv. LAws
c. 24, §§5, 10, 19 (1942); Oa. REV. STAT. §180.060(4) (1953); S.D. CODE
§ 55.1501(5) (1939); VT. REv. STAT. §455 (1947).
146. ARiz. CODE ANN. §§4-601(2), 4-601(4) (Supp. 1951); CAL. POL. CODE
§ 477 (1944); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 67-1401(5), 67-1401(7) (1949); MONT. REv.
CODES ANN. §§82-401(5), 82-401(7), 16-3101(8) (1947); UTAH CODE ANN.
§§67-5-1(5), 67-5-1(7) (1953) ; WAsir. Rav. CODE §§43.10.030(4), 36.27.020 (1951).
Of these, four states require the attorney general to assist the local prosecutor at the
direction of the governor. ARiz. CODE ANN. § 4-601(5) (Supp. 1951); CAL. POL.
CODE § 477 (1944) ; MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 82-401(7) (1947) ; UTAH CODE ANN.
§67-5-1(7) (1953).
147. County of Sacramento v. Central Pacific R.R., 61 Cal. '250 (1882); State
ex rel. Nolan v. District Court, 22 Mont. 25, 55 Pac. 916 (1899).
148. Ploscowe, The Significance of Recent Investigations for the Criminal Law
and Administration of Criminal Justice, 100 U. OF PA. L. Ray. 805, 824 (1952);
Report of the ABA Cominnission on Organized Crime, 76 A.B.A. REP. 385, 402
(1951).
149. De Long, Powers and Duties of the State Attorney-Ge neral in Criminal
Prosecution, 25 J. Cans. L. & CamniNoLoGy 358, 397 (1934).
150. Id. at 358, 396.
151. Da.m. CoNsT. art. III, § 21; DaE.. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 2501 (1953); R.I.
CONST. art. VII, § 12; R.I. GEN. LAWS c. 10 § 2 (1938). New Hampshire provides
that crimes punishable by more than twenty-five years imprisonment are to be prose-
cuted by the attorney general. N.H. R.V LAWS c. 24, § 5 (1942). In Vermont the
attorney general is charged with the prosecution of all homicide cases. VT. REV.
STAT. § 454 (1947).
152. See De Long, supra note 149, at 380.
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tion of prosecution may not be entirely desirable in larger states nor
necessary for the purposes of controlling the prosecutor's discretion. The
desire of a particular community to enforce the laws according to its needs
should be respected if this will not be inimical to the interests of the state,
The local prosecutor's failure to combat organized crime effectively may
be remedied by granting supervisory and supersedure powers at the state
level. The American Bar Association's Commission on Crime 15 S has
proposed that the attorney general be given the power to supersede the
prosecutor whenever he believes this will further the interests of the
state.15 This would provide an immediate remedy for abuses of the
prosecutor's discretion, but should only rarely be necessary since the threat
of supersedure combined with the possibility of a subsequent removal by
the governor or the highest court of the state 155 should deter failures to
prosecute serious violations of the law.
CONCLUSION
Within the statutory framework considered, the application of the
criminal law to individual defendants is subject to a vast amount of
discretion in the prosecutor to effect a flexible system of prosecution.
To protect the individual, some immediate restrictions are imposed. As
against the overzealous, the magistrate and the grand jury function as
some protection against unfounded accusations. Statutory remedies for
delay in accusation or trial safeguard against the malicious and inefficient.
On the other hand, to protect the community's interest in law enforce-
ment, it has been deemed expedient to subject the power of nol pros to
court control and to provide for removal for flagrant violations of duty
rather than force prosecution by a mandamus proceeding. However,
where immediate relief is needed from the prosecutor's neglect of duty,
the attorney general may have the authority to force immediate action.
The efficacy of many of these restrictions is at best open to question.
The magisterial system and the grand jury in many cases may well be
controlled by the prosecutor, and court approval of the nol pros may be
merely perfunctory. Even in the case of a gross abuse of discretion, re-
moval may be extremely difficult due to local political pressures and the
inertia of state governing bodies. Although the attorney general could
provide immediate relief in many states, the failure to impose duties in
the exercise of this power, the fact that criminal matters are a negligible
part of his work and political pressures flowing from his need for votes
make the exercise of this power a rare occasion.
153. ABA CommirssIoN ON ORGANIZED CRIME, ORGANIZED CRIME AND LAW
ENFORIMENT (1953).
154. ABA MODEL DEPARTMENT OF JusICE AcT §7(5) (1953). Under § 7(4) the
attorney general must supsersede when so requested by the governor and may do
so when requested by the grand jury.
155. The Model Act also provides for removal of the local prosecutor by the
governor or the highest court of the state. Id. § 9.
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Public interest in the administration of the criminal law, rather than
further legislation, is needed to insure that the grand jury and magisterial
system operate efficiently. Similarly, since the nol pros is such an essential
tool of prosecution, perhaps it would be unwise to legislate additional re-
strictions on its use. On the other hand, it might be well to consider cur-
ing the defects of the sanctions of removal and the powers of the attorney
general. Removal on petition to the highest court of the state and an ap-
pointed attorney general would reduce the impediment of political pressure.
Imposing duties on the attorney general in the exercise of his powers over
the local prosecutor and extending his activities as a supervisor of the ad-
ministration of the criminal law would reduce the barrier of administrative
inertia. Although the prosecutor's discretion is essential, these measures
might make existing sanctions against its abuse more effective.
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TABLE II
DisTRiBuTIox OF NOL PROS AmoNG OFFENSES CHARGED IN PHILADELPHIA FOR, 19541
Offense Charged
Murder
Voluntary Manslaughter
Sex Crimes
Rape
Burglary
Assault and battery; aggravated
assault and mayhem
Robbery
Arson
Frauds: False pretenses, for-
gery, bad checks
Thefts, larceny, receiving stolen
goods
Embezzlement
Conspiracy, bribery, corrupt so-
licitation, extortion
Perjury, subornation
Guns, carrying concealed weap-
ons, etc.
Lottery, bookmaking
Totals
Guilty
57
46
385
31
440
Acquitted
12
15
92
17
64
1105 433
480 100
4 1
Percentage
of Charges
Total Nol
Nol Pros Accusations Prossed
8 77- 10.4
42 *103 40.8
58 535 10.8
2 50 4.0
16 520 3.0
2116 27.3
605 4.1
5 -
545 55 92 692 13.3
243 146
-1
507 153
1105 308
6267 1518
1. These figures were compiled by and received
Attorney of Philadelphia.
1773 8.2
2 50.0
53 713 7.5
45 1458 3.1
1103 8888 12.4
from the Office of the District
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